This paper investigates how customs union members select the common external tariff (CET) to levy on imports from non-members. A pure exchange, perfectly competitive general equilibrium model of world trade is simulated. Contrary to most previous work, countries have the freedom to share authority over CET choice and to select from a variety of possible coalition forms. The results confirm that when customs unions are observed in the core, members may wish to share responsibility for CET choice in a variety of ways. Generally, however, the member country that is relatively well-endowed or has relatively elastic consumer preferences tends to take the lead in CET choice.
Introduction
How do members of a regional trade agreement (RTA) coordinate trade policy with respect to excluded countries? Apart from a handful of notable exceptions, this fundamental question has received little serious attention in the literature. Nevertheless, it is an issue that is assuming added significance for at least two reasons. First, as the popularity of RTAs grows, more and more countries are finding themselves excluded from agreements that involve strategically important * Melatos wishes to acknowledge financial support for this project from the Australian Research Council (ARC). Woodland also gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the ARC.
unanimous agreement among prospective members for implementation, they are especially difficult to design when the countries involved are heterogeneous. In fact, such difficulties typically manifest themselves as disagreements between members over: (i) the choice of CET rate and (ii) the choice of CETrevenue sharing rule. 1 This occurs because an individual member's preferences over CET rates and sharing rules depend crucially upon that member's own characteristics, not just those of its trading partners situated within and outside the union. For example, each member will have a preferred CET rate based on their own terms-of-trade considerations. Of course, such disagreements do not arise if customs union members are symmetric. Hence, the growing membership asymmetry in RTAs is a particularly important motivating factor for our analysis.
With the notable exception of Karp (1991, 1995) and Syropoulos (2002) , the literature has not attempted to explicitly model the mechanics of external policy coordination among RTA members. Indeed, it has generally avoided the issue, either by assuming symmetric members (Bond and Syropoulos, 1996; Krugman, 1991) or by imposing CET choice rules exogenously Karp (1991, 1995) demonstrate that a union member may prefer to delegate responsibility for choosing the union's common external tariff to its partner. That is, even if the country choosing the CET does so purely to maximise its own welfare, the delegating union member may also benefit. The question of how customs union members select the CET is of particular interest in those cases where a customs union is likely to be observed. Hence, in this paper, we investigate how customs unions that exist in the core determine their CET and relate this to the distribution of preferences and endowments.
In particular, we examine the roles of customs union members in CET determination and examine the range of CETs that are observed in the core.
More recently, Syropoulos (2002) has demonstrated that if the CET and non-member tariffs are strategic complements (substitutes) then the optimal policy-maker in the customs union is the country with the smallest (largest) relative endowment of the factor employed intensively in the union's export sector. This Heckscher-Ohlin style prediction arises because this member's import demand function is more (less) sensitive to price changes and, hence, it has a smaller (larger) best response CET than its partner. This relative passivity (aggression) yields both union members a higher welfare, taking the optimal response of the non-member into account.
Delegation in the sense of Gatsios and Karp and Syropoulos may be characterised as being 'complete' in that one member assumes total authority over the choice of CET. Recently 
The Model
In order to investigate the nature of CET delegation in established customs unions, we simulate endogenous trade bloc formation in a world of asymmetric countries. The simulation model employed is identical to that used in Melatos and Woodland (2007b) . That is, we implement a perfectly competitive pure exchange general equilibrium model in which three countries trade three goods. Each country i exports a unique product i and imports the other two goods -the Armington trade pattern. Optimal import tariffs are levied at all times.
The trade policy game follows a three-stage process. In the first stage, nations form coalitions.
Coalition structures considered include global free trade, unilateral tariff setting (in which all countries stand alone), a customs union involving any two countries (all possible CET rates are considered) and a free trade area involving any two countries. In this paper the only difference between a customs union and a free trade area is that the former levies a CET. In both cases intra-RTA trade is assumed to be duty free. Given the coalition structure, optimal tariffs are chosen. In the case of a customs union, the optimal CET is chosen to maximise a weighted sum of member utilities. In the final stage of the game markets clear. The game is solved backwards for a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. 2 Consumer preferences are represented by constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility functions of the form
where γ i j = 1/3 for all i, j are the consumption distribution parameters and σ i 6 = 1 is the elasticity of substitution. The distribution of endowments is given in Table 1 , where ω j i is the endowment of good j in country i.
We have previously argued that delegation in CET choice is only an issue when customs union members are asymmetric; only then will disagreements arise over the choice of external tariff rate. At the same time, Syropoulos (2002) demonstrates that a member's CET preferences depend crucially on the sensitivity of its import demand function to price changes. In the simulations that follow, we investigate two forms of union member asymmetry -differences in endowments and consumer preferences -which imply different import demand elasticities and, hence, different CET preferences among customs union members. In particular, we vary the endowments of each country's export good ω 
Delegation Authority in Core Customs Unions
It has already been argued that the issue of how members of a particular customs union choose the CET is relevant only in so far as that customs union is likely to be observed; that is, survive in the core. Figures 1 and 2 present the contents of the core for each set of parameters simulated. In both Figures 1 and 2 , the bolded-border cell represents the case in which all countries are identically symmetric. At this point and in its vicinity, global free trade tends to be observed.
Further away from the bolded-border cell the core typically comprises coalition structures in which there are customs unions. These (and other) core structures are indicated by coded shading.
The figures also identify the range of parameter values for which the underlying Armington trade pattern does not hold. In these cases, our model makes no predictions on the nature of the trade equilibrium and the contents of the core.
For those cases where a customs union is observed, the shading of each cell identifies its membership. Within these cells the Pareto optimal and partial delegation ranges of CETs (expressed as percentages) are specified. The first row gives the range of CETs in the core. The second row displays the CETs chosen under complete delegation to the first and second-named member respectively. That is, for CU(i, j), the first number on the second row of each cell refers to the CET rate selected when country i is delegated complete authority over the choice of CET. The second number refers to the CET chosen by country j when it chooses the CET rate unilaterally.
In the case of symmetric members these ranges collapse to a single CET and so only one rate is reported.
For example, in the cell corresponding to (σ 1 , σ 2 ) = (1.1, 1.4) in Figure 1 the core comprises a customs union CU(1, 2) between countries 1 and 2. The range of CETs for which CU(1, 2) is in the core is 16.1% to 18.1%; for CETs outside this range a customs union will not be in the core and, hence, not observed. The second row of this cell shows that the CET would be 14.8% if country 2 were given full CET-setting authority, while it would be 17.3% if that authority were given to country 1. The core thus comprises cases of super delegation to country 1 (where the CET exceeds 17.3%), complete delegation to country 1 (where the CET equals 17.3%) and partial delegation (where the CET is between 16.1% and 17.3%). The cases of partial delegation (where the CET is between 14.8% and 16.1%) and complete delegation to country 2 (where the CET equals 14.8%) are not in the core.
Inspection of Figures 1 and 2 suggests a number of general propositions that arise from our
analysis. The first relates to the nature of delegation within a core customs union. is in the core (moving vertically from the bottom right hand cell in Figure 1 ). This figure contains a plot of the CETs that each of the members of customs union CU(1, 2) would choose individually (cet1 and cet2) and a plot of the minimum and maximum CETs that are Pareto optimal for the members (i.e., the range of customs unions CU (1, 2) in the core, denoted by corelow and corehigh).
In the figure, cet2 lies below cet1 except at the endpoint where σ 1 = σ 2 = 2.4, showing that country 1, if choosing the CET on behalf of the customs union, would always choose the higher tariff rate and is, therefore, the 'aggressive' member. It is particularly noteworthy that the range of CETs in the core, given by corelow and corehigh, not only overlaps the cet1 − cet2 range but also contains CETs outside the cet1 − cet2 range.
The first point to note from an examination of Figure 3 is that partial delegation, whereby the chosen CET is a weighted average of the compete delegation CETs (equivalently, the union chooses positive weights for both members in its welfare function, in the present context), may not be Pareto optimal for the members and, hence, such a union contract may not be in the core. This is the case for all σ 1 ∈ [1.3, 2.3], where CETs in the range corelow − cet2 lie outside the core (i.e., outside the corelow − corehigh range). Customs union contracts giving a large weight (role) to country 2 in the determination of the union's CET will be Pareto dominated by unions giving a lesser role to country 2 and, hence, will not appear in the core.
Second, the core consists of customs unions CU(1, 2) that yield CETs in the range corehigh − cet1. This is the case for all σ 1 ∈ [1.4, 2.3] in the figure. In these cases, the union's CET is larger than even the aggressive member would have chosen if given complete authority to determine the CET. This is a case of super delegation. It implies a choice of weights that translates into a very high CET, distorting the union's offer surface to the non-member in favour of the union members.
These two observations verify Proposition 1 in the case of preferences -partial delegation may not be part of an appropriate union contract and super delegation may be.
(Insert Figure 4 about here)
Proposition 1 may also be verified for variations in endowments using Figure 4 , which refers to a customs union between countries 2 and 3. This customs union is in the core, for example, when ω 11 = 0.73 and ω 22 ∈ [0.76, 0.99] in Figure 2 . Figure 4 plots the same information as plotted in Figure 3 , but this time for variations in endowments. Notice that, in this customs union, country 3 is the aggressive CET setter whenever ω 22 < 0.97, since the cet3 curve is above the cet2 curve in this interval, while country 2 is the aggressive CET setter whenever ω 22 > 0.97, since the cet2 curve is above the cet3 curve in this interval.
Proposition 1 is verified rather strikingly for endowments in this case. It is evident from Figure   4 that, with two exceptions, the partial delegation range of CETs given by the gap cet2 − cet3
lies completely outside the region of core CETs given by the gap corehigh − corelow, verifying that partial delegation may not yield Pareto optimal (core) outcomes. The first exception is at the point of symmetrically identical endowments for the customs union members at ω 22 = 0.97, where both union members agree on the appropriate (Pareto optimal) CET. The second exception is at ω 22 = 0.76, where partial delegation with anything but a very small weight given to country 2 will not constitute a core customs union agreement. Thus, part (i) of the proposition is verified completely in this figure. Part (ii) of Proposition 1 is verified for endowments by the observation that, for all values of ω 22 , with the two exceptions noted above, super delegation is a requirement of every customs union contract. This super delegation is to the most aggressive member -country 3 for low levels of ω 22 and country 2 for high levels. In the first mentioned exception, super delegation is a core agreement with the aggressive member, country 3, getting a large weight and country 2 getting a small weight. 3 In these two cases, the CET is higher than the aggressive member would have chosen had it been the complete delegation of tariff setting authority. The second mentioned exception is the trivial case where the issue of delegation does not arise.
The above discussion suggests that so long as customs union members are even slightly asymmetric, it is Pareto efficient for them to share authority over CET choice in some way. In other words, while complete delegation á la Gatsios and Karp and Syropoulos is often observed as a Pareto efficient outcome in our simulations, it is never observed as the unique Pareto efficient outcome. Indeed, it is often the case that complete delegation does not reside in the Pareto optimal set at all. This merely reinforces the point made by Melatos and Woodland (2007a) , although in the framework adopted here countries have access to a significantly wider range of options with regards coalition formation. Further, it suggests that the complete delegation arguments advanced by Gatsios and Karp and Syropoulos are only part of the story.
Proposition 1 gives a general prediction regarding the nature of delegation likely to be observed in core customs unions. However, it provides little guidance on the direction of delegation; that is, which country will be vested with greater authority to choose the CET. The next proposition addresses this question directly.
Proposition 2 When a customs union is in the core, if member preferences (export endowments) differ even 'slightly' then the member with the more inelastic preferences (respectively, greater endowment of the export good) assumes greater authority in common external tariff choice.
Proposition 2 may be verified for preferences with reference to Figure 3 . In this figure, a customs union CU(1, 2) that gives a strong role (large weight) to the aggressive country 1 will appear in the core. Such unions are represented by contracts yielding CETs in the range cet1 − corehigh. In these cases, the aggressive member is given greater authority than country 1 in the upper section of the CET range. Moreover, the aggressive member, country 1, is characterized by having the lower elasticity of substitution since σ 1 < σ 2 = 2.4, except at the endpoint. Thus, the country with the lowest elasticity of substitution assumes greater authority in CET determination in the customs union.
In order to verify Proposition 2 for endowments consider, once again, Figure 4 . Note that the Pareto optimal (core) range corehigh − corelow is higher on average than (indeed, almost always above) the partial delegation range cet2 − cet1. It is recalled that country 3 is the aggressive CET setter whenever ω 22 < 0.97, which corresponds to country 3 being better endowed than country 2, while country 2 is the aggressive CET setter whenever ω 22 > 0.97, which corresponds to country 2 being best endowed country. Thus, delegation (here super delegation) is toward the country that is relatively well endowed in its export good, thus verifying the proposition.
Our simulations suggest a third proposition regarding the nature of the set of Pareto efficient customs union contracts.
Proposition 3 For a customs union that is in the core, the range of common external tariffs tends to expand as member preferences (export endowments) diverge.
Again referring to Figure 3 , we can verify Proposition 3 in the case of preferences. At low levels of σ 1 , where the divergence of preferences is greatest, the range of Pareto optimal (core) CETs is largest. This range of Pareto optimal CETs gradually diminishes in size and vanishes once the elasticity of substitutions in the two countries converge to equality at σ 1 = σ 2 = 2.4. Thus, the greater the divergence of preferences of the two customs union members, the greater the range of common external tariff rates that reside in the core.
To verify Proposition 3 for endowments note that in Figure 4 the Pareto optimal range of CETs is widest when ω 22 is smallest or largest, and becomes generally smaller as ω 22 converges towards the value of ω 22 = 0.97 (as does the partial delegation range cet2 − cet1). At this value, countries 2 and 3 have the same endowments of their respective export goods. Thus, the set of potential CETs for the customs union is larger the greater the divergence in endowments of the union members.
As a final remark on the delegation results for the endowment experiment, we observe that Proposition 2 seems in the spirit of Syropoulos' (2002) Proposition 2. This proposition states that "If ROW's tariff is a strategic complement (strategic substitute) to the union's CET, then CU members should delegate authority over CET choice to the member with the smallest (largest) relative endowment of the factor employed intensively in the CUs export sector." For every case that we have tested using our simulation model, union and non-member tariffs are strategic substitutes.
More generally, the intuition for Proposition 2 is as follows. In a customs union, authority over common external tariff choice is delegated to that member who can induce the non-member nation to levy the lowest tariffs on member exports. This occurs because the parameter and functional form assumptions underlying this analysis invariably produce an inverse relationship between a country's welfare and the tariffs levied on its exports by its trading partners. In Figure 1 , it turns out that the union member characterised by a relatively low elasticity of substitution in consumption is always the one that can induce the lowest rest of world tariff. Thus, authority over common external tariff choice is delegated (and, in the words of Melatos and Woodland (2007a) , often 'super delegated') to this member. Likewise, in Figure 2 , the union member with the larger export endowment can induce the non-member to levy a lower tariff on customs union exports.
Conclusion
The issue of how a customs union sets it common external tariff rates has only recently been addressed in the literature. The results in this paper shed some light on this issue. Importantly, it has been shown that core customs unions may exhibit 'super-delegation' as well as 'partialdelegation' of tariff-setting authority. Furthermore, when a customs union forms it is typically the member which is relatively well-endowed with its export good or has the relatively inelastic preferences that assumes greatest responsibility for external tariff choice. Future research in this field could consider explicitly modeling CET choice as the outcome of a political bargaining game between customs union members. 
